Citation gaming induced by bibliometric evaluation: a country-level comparative analysis by Baccini, Alberto et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
4.
04
70
8v
1 
 [c
s.D
L]
  9
 A
pr
 20
19
Citation gaming induced by bibliometric evaluation: a
country-level comparative analysis ∗
Alberto Baccini† Giuseppe De Nicolao‡ Eugenio Petrovich§
Abstract
It is several years since national research evaluation systems around the globe started
making use of quantitative indicators to measure the performance of researchers. Neverthe-
less, the eﬀects on these systems on the behavior of the evaluated researchers are still largely
unknown. We attempt to shed light on this topic by investigating how Italian researchers
reacted to the introduction in 2011 of national regulations in which key passages of profes-
sional careers are governed by bibliometric indicators. A new inwardness measure, able to
gauge the degree of scientiﬁc self-referentiality of a country, is deﬁned as the proportion of
citations coming from the country itself compared to the total number of citations gathered
by the country. Compared to the trends of the other G10 countries in the period 2000-
2016, Italy’s inwardness shows a net increase after the introduction of the new evaluation
rules. Indeed, globally and also for a large majority of the research ﬁelds, Italy became the
European country with the highest inwardness. Possible explanations are proposed and dis-
cussed, concluding that the observed trends are strongly suggestive of a generalized strategic
use of citations, both in the form of author self-citations and of citation clubs. We argue
that the Italian case oﬀers crucial insights on the constitutive eﬀects of evaluation systems.
As such, it could become a paradigmatic case in the debate about the use of indicators in
science-policy contexts.
Keywords: Bibliometric Indicators, Performance-based Research Evalua-
tion Systems, Inwardness, Research Policy, Academic Careers, Italy, G10.
∗Funding: This work was supported by Institute For New Economic Thinking Grant ID INO17-00015.
†Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Siena, Italy; alberto.baccini@unisi.it
‡Department of Electrical, Computer and Biomedical Engineering, University of Pavia, Italy
§Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Siena, Italy
1
1 Introduction
Starting from the late 1980s, several European and extra-European countries implemented
national systems to monitor, assess, and evaluate the research performance of their scientiﬁc
workforce (1, 2). One of the key features of such research evaluation systems is the focus
on quantitative indicators (metrics) as crucial science policy tools (3). Accordingly, in
the last years, several scientometric indicators, based on publications or citations (or on
a combination of both, such as the h-index ), have increasingly appeared in the academic
evaluation systems, alongside with the traditional peer-review-based procedures.
The use of these indicators in the evaluation of research performance has generated a
heated debate in the scientiﬁc community. The advocates argue that scientometric measures
are not only more objective than the peer-review (4); they would also improve both the
quantity and the quality of the scientiﬁc production (5, 6). This would occur because
the indicators are integrated within a system of incentives that rewards the achievement
of the scientometric targets set by the evaluation system (7). On the other hand, critics
claim that the same mechanisms that are designed to improve the research performance
create at the same time room for strategic behaviors (8). For instance, when productivity
is positively rewarded, the number of publications become a goal that can be pursued not
only by positive behaviors (doing more research), but also by opportunistic strategies (e.g.,
slicing one scientiﬁc work into multiple publications) (9, 10). Analogously, when citations
become a goal, the «citation game» starts (11). A mediating position is represented by
scholars proposing a «responsible use» of metrics. According to this approach, research
metrics can provide valuable insights on the research performance, granted that they are
carefully designed in order to avoid unintended consequences. Thus, a distillation of best
practices has been proposed for improving the use of metrics in research assessment (12).
Recently, the idea that the consequences of the use of indicators on the behavior of
researchers can be easily sorted between the intended and the unintended ones, has been
questioned as too simplistic (13, 14). Instead, the notion of «constitutive eﬀects» has been
advanced to capture the way in which the indicators act on the researchers (15). Within
this new framework, indicators are conceived as shaping the activity of research deeply and
at diﬀerent levels, from the citation habits to the research agenda, redeﬁning at the same
time key evaluative terms such as research quality (16). They become crucial actors in the
«epistemic living spaces» of academic researchers (17) and researchers begin to «think with
indicators» pervasively (18).
The main constitutive eﬀects of the indicators described in the literature can be grouped
into three main types: i) Goal-displacement: scoring high on the indicators becomes a target
in itself, that is to be achieved also by gaming the system (19, 20); ii) Risk avoidance: highly
innovative, not mainstream, and interdisciplinary research topics are avoided because they
could do not score well on indicators that tend to reward more traditional research pro-
grammes (18, 21–25); iii) Task reduction: when academic activities such as teaching and
public engagement are not rewarded, academics tend to avoid them to concentrate only on
publishable academic research (26–28).
Although these eﬀects have been highly debated, until recently the evidence of their occur-
rence has been mainly anecdotal. It is only in the last years that the methodical empirical
study of such eﬀects has been undertaken (13, 21). In the present paper, we aim to advance
the knowledge on this topic by focusing on the case of Italy. Among European and extra-
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European countries, Italy is the only one in which some key career passages of scientiﬁc
researchers 1 are entirely regulated by rules based on bibliometric indicators. Thus, Italy
is ideally suited to studying the response of researchers to the use of metrics in research
evaluation.
In particular, we will investigate whether Italian scientists have pervasively adopted a
strategic use of citations in order to boost their indicators. By “pervasively”, we mean that
the eﬀect of this behavior should be visible in the great majority of scientific fields, at the
national level. As we will highlight in the Conclusion, the Italian case provides important
insights on the constitutive eﬀects of evaluation systems in general.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next two sections, the speciﬁcity
of the Italian case is explained and the literature dealing with self-citing strategic behaviors
is reviewed. Next, a new “inwardness” indicator is introduced that is sensitive to collective
strategic citation behaviors at a country level. In the Data section, the procedure for retriev-
ing the data is described, while the main ﬁndings are presented in the Results section. In the
Discussion, after examining alternative explanations, it is argued in favor of the emergence
of a collective strategic behavior devised to meet the demands of the evaluation system. In
the Conclusion, some general lessons from the Italian case are drawn.
2 The Italian case
In 2010, the Italian university system underwent a wide process of reformation, regulated
by the Law 240/2010. The reform created the Agency for the Evaluation of the University
and Research (ANVUR), a centralized agency whose main task is the monitoring and the
evaluation of the Italian research system. The Agency started in 2011 a research assessment
exercise called VQR, relative to the period 2004-2010. A second research assessment exercise
was started in 2015, relative to the period 2011-2014. In both exercises, the evaluation of
submitted articles was largely based on the automatic or semi-automatic use of algorithms
fed by citation indicators (29) while other research outputs, such as books, were evaluated
by peer reviews.
The reform modiﬁed also the recruitment and advancement system for university profes-
sors by introducing the National Scientiﬁc Habilitation (ASN). Both for hiring and promo-
tion, having obtained the ASN has become mandatory for applying to academic positions.
The bibliometric rules rely on three indicators. For the hard sciences, life sciences, and
engineering, the indicators considered by ANVUR are the number of journal articles, the
number of citations, and the h-index. For the social science and humanities, the indicators
are the number of research outputs, the number of monographs, and the number of papers
published in “class A” journals. At each new round of habilitation, ANVUR calculates for
each of these indicators the “bibliometric thresholds” that the candidates must overcome to
achieve the ASN.2 Candidates whose indicators do not overcome two thresholds out of three
cannot be habilitated (exceptions were possible in speciﬁc circumstances only in the ﬁrst
edition, ASN 2012). When ﬁrst introduced, the thresholds were stated to be the median
1Except for the scholars in the Social Sciences and Humanities (see next section).
2For the first edition of the ASN the national rules were defined in the Ministerial Decree 7 June
2012 n. 76. http://attiministeriali.miur.it/media/192901/dm_07_06_12_regolamento_abilitazione.pdf.
ANVUR defined the thresholds used for the first edition of the ASN:
https://web.archive.org/web/20190207112821/http://www.anvur.it/attivita/asn/asn-2012-2013/indicatori-
e-relative-mediane/.
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values of the indicators of the permanent academic staﬀ holding that position (associate
or full professor). To make and example, in order to obtain a full professor habilitation,
the candidate was required to score better than half of the current full professors in two
indicators out of three. Applicants overcoming the ﬁxed thresholds are then evaluated by a
committee composed by ﬁve referees who are in charge of the ﬁnal decision about attributing
habilitation.
Note that the focus on indicators is not conﬁned to the national procedures but “trickles
down” to the university committees in charge of recruiting and promotion that are required
to take into account production and citation metrics when they evaluate and rank the
habilitated applicants. Finally, also the members of both the national habilitation and the
local recruitment committees are required to overcome bibliometric thresholds.
In sum, in Italy, starting from 2011, bibliometric indicators have gained a central role not
only in the national research assessment but in the entire body of the recruitment procedures.
A remarkable peculiarity of the Italian system is that the indicators based on citations, used
both in the habilitation procedure and in the research evaluation exercise, are calculated
by including self-citations. Thus, researchers can increase their indicators just by self-citing
their own work.
Anecdotal evidence of the adoption of strategic behaviors in the form of author self-
citations has been presented by Baccini (30). Two recent studies have documented more
thoroughly the rise of opportunistic behaviors in response to the ASN rules. Seeber et
al. has analyzed how the use of self-citations in four Italian research areas changed after
the introduction of the habilitation procedure. They have found that scientists in need of
meeting the thresholds (i.e., those looking for habilitation as a prerequisite for tenure-track
or promotion to full professor) did increase signiﬁcantly their self-citations after 2010 (31).
Scarpa et al. focused on the Italian engineering area and found an anomalous peak in
the self-citations rate (i.e., the number of self-citations to the total number of citations) in
correspondence of the second round of the habilitation procedure, in 2013. (32).
3 Strategic behaviors and country self-citations
Even if the afore-mentioned studies have highlighted some recent behavior changes of Italian
scientists, they did not address a subtler form of strategic behavior, the one based on the
so-called «citation clubs» or «citation cartels». A citation club is an informal structure
in which citations are strategically exchanged among its members to boost the respective
citation scores (33–35). Note that this kind of strategy cannot be spotted when we use
the standard deﬁnition of self-citation, according to which a self-citation occurs whenever
the set of co-authors of the citing papers and that of the cited one are not disjoint (36,
37), because the members of the citation club might not be also co-authors. In order to
allow for the eﬀects of citation clubs, we examine a particular – and not much studied –
form of self-citations, namely the country self-citations (38). A country self-citation occurs
whenever the set of the countries of the authors of the citing publication and the set of the
countries of the authors of the cited publication are not disjoint, that is, if these two sets
share at least one country (39, 40). Notably, any citation exchanged within a citation club
formed by researchers working in the same country is counted as country self-citations, even
when it is not an author self-citation.
Thus, considering that most of the standard author self-citations are country self-citations
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too,3 by analyzing the country self-citations, we can capture both the “classic” strategy based
on author self-citations, and the “elaborated” one based on citation clubs. As far as we are
interested in countries and not in the individual authors, we will say, by short, that a paper
is “authored by a country” when at least one of its authors is from that country.
Just as not all author self-citations originate from gaming purposes, in the same way not
all country self-citations are the result of opportunistic behaviors. Indeed, the literature on
author self-citations agrees on the fact that a certain amount of them is a normal byproduct
of the scientiﬁc communication. There are many perfectly legitimate reasons for citing one’s
own works, such as building on previously obtained results, avoiding repetition, and so on
(41–43). By the same token, it is normal that a country has an internal exchange of citations
amongst its researchers insofar the knowledge produced by the country is used (i.e., cited)
by the same country’s scientiﬁc staﬀ.
Moreover, international collaboration positively aﬀects the number of country self-citations.
In fact, the more a country collaborates with other countries, the higher will be the number
of country self-citations. Take for instance a paper authored in collaboration by Italy and
France. Any future citation to that paper coming from an Italian-authored or a French-
authored publication will count as a country self-citation for both Italy and France, since
the citing and the cited publication will share at least one country of aﬃliation.
In sum, the country self-citations are not per se a sign of strategic behavior since they
depend both on the internal exchange of knowledge within a country and the amount of in-
ternational collaboration. Nonetheless, if the researchers of a single country initiate strategic
behaviors in order to boost their citations, this is likely to produce an anomalous increase
of country self-citations compared to the other countries.
4 The inwardness indicator
In order to obtain a normalized measure of country self-citations, we introduce a simple
indicator of “inwardness”. For a given year and a country c, the inwardness is deﬁned as
the percentage ratio between the total number of country self-citations (Sc) and the total
number of citations (Cc) of that country :
Ic =
Sc
Cc
× 100 (1)
The minimum value of the inwardness indicator is Ic = 0 when a country has no self-
citations; and the maximum is Ic = 100 when a country has self-citations only, that is
Sc = Cc.It is easy to show that the inwardness indicator is a variant of the Relative Ci-
tation Impact (RCI) of a country. The RCI is deﬁned by May (44) as the ratio between
the average citation per paper of a country and the average citation per paper of the world
(see also (45)). The RCI of the country c in a given year is deﬁned as RCIc =
Cc
Pc
×
Pw
Cw
where Cc and Cw are the total number of citations of the country and of the world, and Pc
and Pw the publications of the country and of the world. The total number of citations is
the sum of the country self-citations (Sc) and the external citation (Xc); when the world is
considered Cw = Sw, since obviously Xw = 0. If a Relative Self-citation Impact is deﬁned
as RSIc =
Sc
Pc
×
Pw
Sw
, the inwardness indicator can be expressed as
3The only exception being authors that changed their country between the citing and the cited publication.
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Ic =
RSIc
RCIc
=


Sc
Pc
Sw
Pw

 ×


Cw
Pw
Cc
Pc

 =
Sc
Cc
(2)
Note that the inwardness indicator is normalized for the size of the country in terms of
publications. From a conceptual point of view, the inwardness of a country is an indicator
of how much the knowledge produced in the form of scientiﬁc publications in a given year
in a country ﬂows, through citations, into the knowledge produced in that country in the
following years (46–48). Indeed, 1 − Ic indicates how much of the knowledge produced in
a year in a country ﬂows, through citations, into the knowledge (publications) produced by
other countries (49, 50). A higher level of inwardness suggests that the knowledge produced
by a country attracts mainly the interest of the national community. By contrast, a lower
level suggests that the research of the country does not remain conﬁned within its own
borders but ﬂows also toward the rest of the world.
As said above, the strategic use of citations, both as author self-citations and as citation
clubs, aﬀects the country self-citations and, hence, also the inwardness indicator. The start
of a strategic use of citations at the country level should therefore be associated with an
anomalous rise of the inwardness indicator.
Recall, however, that inwardness is positively aﬀected also by increases of international
collaboration. It is therefore necessary to control the trend of the international collaboration
before concluding that an inwardness rise is due to strategic behaviors and not to an increase
of international collaboration.
5 Data
We retrieved the data for calculating the Inwardness indicator from SCIval, an Elsevier’s
owned platform powered by Scopus data. (https://www.scival.com/home)4 In particular,
we exported from SCIval two metrics: (1) Citation Count including self-citations, and (2)
Citation Count excluding self-citations. For both metrics, we included articles, reviews,
and conference papers, leaving aside other types of publications. The ﬁrst Citation Count
metrics represents the countries’ total number of citations, whereas the countries’ number
of self-citations was obtained as the diﬀerence between (1) and (2). 5
We retrieved the data for the G10 countries (Belgium-BE, Canada-CA, France-FR,
Germany-DE, Italy-IT, Japan-JP, the Netherlands-NL, Sweden-SE, Switzerland-CH, United
Kingdom-GB, United States-US). In order to study the spread of the strategic behavior in
diﬀerent research areas, data were exported for all the Scopus ﬁelds aggregated, i.e., without
any ﬁlter for subject area, and for each of the 27 Scopus Main Categories (total number
of datasets = 28), for the years 2000-2016 included. In order to account for the eﬀect of
international collaboration on the inwardness indicators, we retrieved from SCIval also the
Percentage of International Collaboration metric for the target countries. The percentage of
4The data were exported from SCIval on October 16, 2018. They correspond to the last update on Scopus of
September 21, 2018.
5Note that the SCIval’s definition is binary and non-fractional: a citation can either be a self-citation or not
(51). The weight of a country self-citation remains always 1, irrespective of the number of countries producing
the citing or the cited publications: if an Italian publication is cited by another Italian publication, this self-
citation will have the same weight as if the same publication was cited by an international Italo-French-Chinese
publication.
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Table 1: Inwardness delta. Delta is calculated as simple difference (p.p.) between the inwardness
in the last and the first year of the period.
Country ∆1 (2000-2008) ∆2 (2008-2016) ∆tot (2000-2016)
Belgium 1.42 3.29 4.72
Canada 1.04 3.43 4.46
France 1.57 2.68 4.25
Germany 1.69 5.47 7.17
Italy 1.82 8.29 10.11
Japan 0.6 3.2 3.81
Netherlands 2 3.54 5.54
Sweden 0.94 3.32 4.27
Switzerland 0.94 3.32 4.27
United Kingdom 1.45 4.4 5.85
United States 0.14 2.87 3.01
Mean G10 countries 1.24 3.98 5.22
international collaboration for a country in a given year is deﬁned as the share of publications
of the country coauthored by at least one diﬀerent country. The graphs were implemented
in R by using the package “ggplot2” (52).
6 Results
Figure 1 shows the trend of the inwardness over time for the eleven target countries (all
Scopus ﬁelds aggregated). All countries share a rather similar proﬁle with apparent diﬀer-
ences in the absolute value. The ranking is partially explained by the size of the scientiﬁc
production of the countries. Countries with a large scientiﬁc output, such as the Unites
States, naturally attract more citations from their own production, simply because they
have more citing and citable articles than smaller countries such as Belgium. For all the
countries under analysis, not only the inwardness increases slowly and regularly over time,
but the yearly ranks of countries according to their inwardness are remarkably stable.
In this landscape, Italy stands out as a notable exception. In 2000, at the beginning of the
period, Italy has an inwardness of 20.62% and ranks sixth, just behind UK. In 2016, at the
end of the period, Italy ranks second, with an inwardness of 30.73%. Note that, until 2009,
Italy’s inwardness grows parallel to those of comparable countries (UK, Germany, France).
However, around 2010, the Italian trend shows a sudden acceleration. In the following six
years, Italy overcomes UK, Germany, and Japan, becoming the ﬁrst European country and
the second one in the G10 group.
Table 1 shows the variations (deltas) of the inwardness for each country, for the whole
period and by considering two sub-periods, 2008-2000 and 2016-2008. Note that in the ﬁrst
period, Italy’s increase is in line with other countries, while in the second period (2008-
2016), Italy’s exhibits the largest inwardness delta: 8.29 p.p., more than 4 p.p. above the
G10 average and almost 3 p.p. above Germany. As a result, Italy is by far the country with
the highest inwardness delta also in the whole period 2000-2016 (10.11 p.p. vs 5.22 of the
G10 average).
However, as already said, inwardness is aﬀected by the amount of International Col-
laboration of a country. In order to allow for this eﬀect, in Figure 2, inwardness is plotted
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Figure 1: Inwardness for G10 countries (2000-2016). Source: elaboration on SCIval data.
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against the average international collaboration score of each country. More precisely, in-
wardness at year Y is plotted against the three-years moving average value of international
collaboration calculated starting from year Y. In fact inwardness at year Y depends also on
citations coming from publications appeared in the following years (53).
The data shows indeed a positive relation between the two variables: for all the countries,
inwardness grows with the average international collaboration. The plot shows a peculiar
trajectory for Italy. Although for most years Italy ranks last in Europe for international
collaboration (x-axis), nevertheless, at the end of the period, it is the ﬁrst European country
for inwardness (y-axis). Before 2010, Italy is close to and moves together with a group of
three European countries, namely Germany, UK, and France. Starting from 2010, Italy
departs from the group along a steep trajectory, to eventually become the European country
with the lowest international collaboration and the highest inwardness.
Until now, we focused on the aggregated output of the target countries, without consid-
ering the diﬀerent research areas (Scopus Main Categories). In order to investigate whether
and how inwardness changes across research areas, we calculated the inwardness time series
for each of the 27 Scopus Main Categories. The time series, as well as the scatterplots of the
inwardness against the international collaboration, are fully provided in the Supplementary
Materials. For reasons of space, these data are summarized in Figure 3, where the variation
of the inwardness indicator in the periods 2000-2008 (A) and 2008-2016 (B) is displayed
for each of the 27 Scopus Categories. Italy shows a remarkable diﬀerence between the two
periods. In the ﬁrst one (Figure 3A), before the university reform, Italy is in line with the
other G10 countries in most of the research ﬁelds. In the second period, after the reform,
Italy stands out with the highest inwardness increase in 23 out of 27 ﬁelds. The only ex-
ceptions are earth and planetary sciences (EPS), multidisciplinary (MUL), nursing (NUR),
and physics and astronomy (PA).
As we show in the Supplementary Materials, the inwardness increase is not matched
by a parallel increase of the international collaboration at the ﬁeld level. In particular, at
the end of the period, Italy is the European country with the lowest level of international
collaboration and the highest value of inwardness in the following Scopus Categories (11 on
27): agricultural and biological sciences (ABS), biochemistry, genetics and molecular biology
(BGMB), chemical engineering (CE), economics, econometrics and ﬁnance (EEF), earth
and planetary sciences (EPS), environmental science (ES), immunology and microbiology
(IM), pharmacology, toxicology and pharmaceutics (PTP), veterinary (VET). In other 9
Categories, Italy is ﬁrst for inwardness but not the lowest for international collaboration:
business, management and accounting (BMA), computer science (CS), dentistry (DEN),
decision sciences (DS), engineering (ENG), health professions (HP), mathematics (MAT),
materials science (MS), psychology (PSY). Note that the Italian production in the arts and
humanities (AH) and social sciences (SOC) is only partially covered by Scopus as a large
part is published in books and in the national language. Therefore, the results about these
scholarly areas should be taken with great caution (54).
7 Discussion
As seen from Figure 1 and Table 1 Italy shows a diﬀerent trend compared to the other
G10 countries. The most notable aspect is that, after 2009, Italy’s inwardness grows faster.
The acceleration is about synchronous with the launch of the national assessment exer-
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Figure 2: Inwardness versus average international collaboration for the G10 countries. The
average international collaboration is the 3-year moving average calculated starting from the
considered year. The international collaboration is defined as the share of publications of a
country coauthored by at least a coauthor of a different country. Source: elaboration from
SCIval data.
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Figure 3: Inwardness delta in Scopus Main Categories in the periods 2000-2008 (A) and 2008-
2016 (B). ABS = Agricultural and Biological Sciences, AH = Arts and Humanities, BGMB =
Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology, BMA = Business, Management and Accounting,
CE = Chemical Engineering, CHEM = Chemistry, CS = Computer Science, DEN = Dentistry,
DS = Decision Sciences, E = Energy, EEF = Economics, Econometrics and Finance, ENG =
Engineering, EPS = Earth and Planetary Sciences, ES = Environmental Science, HP = Health
Professions, IM = Immunology and Microbiology, MAT = Mathematics, MED= Medicine, MS
= Materials Science, MUL = Multidisciplinary, NEU = Neuroscience, NUR = Nursing, PA =
Physics and Astronomy, PSY = Psychology, PTP = Pharmacology, Toxicology and Pharmaceu-
tics, SOC = Social Sciences, VET = Veterinary. Source: elaboration from SCIval data.
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cise in 2011 and the opening in 2012 of the ASN, the new scientiﬁc habilitation system,
whose bibliometric criteria, largely relying on citations, had been announced in 2011. A
likely explanation of the anomalous trend is that the Italian scientiﬁc community reacted to
the bibliometric thresholds set by ANVUR by citing more frequently the Italian scientiﬁc
production. More speciﬁcally, we argue that the change in the citation behavior is due to
the widely spread adoption, by Italian researchers, of strategies for boosting bibliometric
indicators set by ANVUR. As said in the Introduction, such strategies include both the
artiﬁcial increase of author self-citations and the creation of nationally-based citation clubs.
The Italian anomalous trend is possibly the joint result of these two strategic answers to
the incentives of the evaluation system. The slight discrepancy between the starting year
of the inwardness acceleration and the launch of bibliometric evaluation system, with the
former occurring slightly earlier than the latter, is easily explained by the “backward eﬀect”
typical of citation measures. Any change in the citation habits taking place in a given year
produces a backward eﬀect on the citation scores of the previous years because researchers
cite previously published papers, so that the change reverberates also on the citation scores
of the past production. The Italian ASN used time horizons of 10 and 15 years for counting
citations and for calculating h-indexes of applicants and referees. Citations received by the
most recent articles have a more lasting eﬀect in the calculations of forthcoming indicators.
It is therefore more convenient to self-cite one’s own recent production rather than the re-
mote one. Hence, a strategic reaction to rules introduced in year 2011 is expected to produce
an inwardness acceleration that starts a few years before, just as observed for Italy.
Two alternative explanations of the data could be advanced. The Italian acceleration
may be due to a sudden rise, after 2009, of the amount of international collaborations. In
fact, we have already observed that, other things left unchanged, an increase of international
collaboration positively aﬀects the inwardness indicator. However, Figure 2 rules out this
alternative explanation. No peculiar increase in the Italian international collaboration can be
spotted. A second alternative explanation argues that the inwardness acceleration may due
to the narrowing of the scientiﬁc focus of Italian researchers, i.e. to a dynamic of scientiﬁc
specialization which led to a growth of author self-citations (31). The idea is that focusing
on narrower topics results in a contraction of the scientiﬁc community of reference. Thus,
the number of citable papers would diminish and the chances for author self-citation would
correspondingly increase, generating also the growth of the country self-citations. Actually,
no evidence can be showed that directly falsiﬁes the specialization explanation. Nonetheless,
this explanation appears implausible because it would imply that Italian researchers in all
ﬁelds have suddenly redirected their focus to topics mainly investigated in the national
community. This changing behavior would be not only peculiar of Italy, but also so strong
to lead Italy to diverge from the other G10 countries in terms of inwardness. Notably, Figure
3 shows that the post-2008 acceleration is visible in most of the research areas in Italy. Not
only the change in the behavior has been generalized, regarding most of the ﬁelds of research,
but in some ﬁelds, such as engineering (ENG), mathematics (MAT) or veterinary (VET),
the increase reached outstanding proportions. In any case, it would still be necessary to
explain why specialization occurred only in Italy and at the same time as the adoption of
new rules for evaluation.
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8 Conclusion
In this paper, we contributed to the empirical study of the constitutive eﬀects that indicator-
based research evaluation systems have on the behavior of the evaluated researchers. By
focusing on the Italian case, we investigated how the Italian scientiﬁc community responded,
at the national level, to the introduction of a research evaluation system, in which bibliomet-
ric indicators play a crucial role. Our results show that the behavior of Italian researchers
has indeed changed after the introduction of the evaluation system following the 2010 uni-
versity reform. Such a change is visible at a national scale in most of the scientific fields. We
explained this as the result of the pervasively adoption of strategic citation behaviors within
the Italian scientiﬁc community. In particular, the inwardness indicator was able to track
the eﬀects of two types of citation strategies: the opportunistic use of author self-citation
and the creation of citation clubs exchanging citations between their members. Even if
further research is needed to assess the respective weight of these two strategies, it is their
joint presence that best explains the peculiar trend of the Italian inwardness, exhibiting a
neat acceleration after 2010.
In sum, the comparative analysis of the inwardness indicator showed that Italian research
grew in insularity in the years after the adoption of the new rules of evaluation. Indeed,
results show that, both globally and for many research ﬁelds, while the level of international
collaboration remained stable and comparatively low, the research produced in the country
tended to be increasingly cited by papers authored by at least an Italian scholar. Put in other
words: the share of citations to Italian articles received by articles authored by non-Italian
authors sharply decreased after 2010.
We believe that three main lessons can be derived from the Italian case. Firstly, our
results conﬁrm that scientists are quickly responsive to the system of incentives in which
they act (31). Thus, any policy aiming at introducing or modifying such a system should
be designed and implemented very carefully. In particular, considerable attention should
be placed on the constitutive eﬀects of bibliometric indicators. They are not neutral mea-
sures of performance but actively interact and quickly shape the behavior of the evaluated
researchers.
Secondly, our results show that the «responsible use» of metrics would not be enough
to prevent the emergence of strategic behaviors. For instance, the Leiden Manifesto recom-
mends the use of a «suite of indicators» instead of a single one as a way to prevent gaming
and goal displacement (see the principle number 9 in (12)). The Italian case shows that,
even if the researchers are evaluated against multiple indicators, as recommended, strategic
behaviors manifest themselves anyway.
Lastly, our results prompt some reﬂections on the viability of the mixed evaluation sys-
tems, in which the indicators are intended for complementing or integrating the expert
judgment expressed by the peer review. In fact, the Italian system was designed in principle
according to such a mixed approach, both for the research assessment exercises where re-
search products were evaluated by bibliometric indicators or by peer reviewers, and for the
ASN where to overcome bibliometric thresholds is but a necessary condition for being ad-
mitted to the ﬁnal evaluation by habilitation committees. Nonetheless, our results show that
the mere presence of bibliometric indicators in the evaluative procedures is enough to struc-
turally aﬀect the behavior of the scientists, fostering opportunistic strategies. Therefore,
there is the concrete risk that in mixed evaluation systems, the indicator-based component
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overcomes the peer review-based one. Hence, they de facto collapse to indicator-centric
approaches. We believe that further research is needed to better understand and fully ap-
preciate the possibility of such a collapse. In the meantime, we suggest that policy makers
should exercise the most extreme caution in the use of indicators in science policy contexts.
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